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NOTE
NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA: THE SUPREME COURT
WALKS A WOBBLY LINE IN THE FACE OF DRUNK
DRIVING ANONYMOUS TIPS
Erika L. Lukenbill†
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 2008, California Highway Patrol (CHP) pulled over a
vehicle on the basis of an anonymous tip, and subsequently arrested the
occupants of the vehicle for possession of marijuana.1 The anonymous tipster
reported that a silver Ford F-150 pickup bearing license plate number
8D94925 had run the caller off the roadway.2 She also reported that she had
last seen the vehicle five minutes prior going southbound on Highway 1 at
mile marker 88.3 Dispatch broadcasted the information to California
Highway Patrol (‘‘CHP’’) at 3:47 p.m.4 Already on Highway 1 and heading
north, a CHP officer spotted the reported vehicle at 4:00 p.m.5 The officer
turned around and at 4:05 p.m. he pulled over the F-150, approximately
twenty-three minutes after the call was placed.6 That officer was joined by a
second, and as the two officers approached the vehicle they smelled
marijuana.7 The officers searched the truck bed, found 30 pounds of
marijuana, and arrested the two occupants of the truck.8 The men eventually
†
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University School of Law (2016); B.A., German and B.A., Law and Society, University of
Calgary (2012).
1. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686-87 (2014). The original tip was received
by Humboldt County Dispatch and was not an anonymous call; the tipster identified herself
by name and Humboldt County had a recording of the conversation. Id. at 1687 n.1. At the
evidentiary hearing, however, the prosecution failed to call both the tipster and the Humboldt
County dispatcher who took the call. Id. As a result, the court proceeded to treat the call as an
anonymous tip and it made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States as an
anonymous tip. Id.
2. Id. at 1686-87. At no point in the phone call did the anonymous tipster claim that the
driver of the reported vehicle was intoxicated.
3. Id. at 1686.
4. Id. at 1687.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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‘‘[pled] guilty to transporting marijuana and were sentenced to 90 days in jail
plus three years of probation.’’9
Even though the officers knew nothing about the tipster-----not her name
nor how to locate her-----the prosecution argued that the tip provided by the
unknown and unaccountable informant provided the officers with enough
reliable information to create reasonable suspicion for the original
investigatory stop.10 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court of the
United States, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, presented the issue
as ‘‘whether the 911 call was sufficiently reliable to credit the allegation the
petitioners’ truck ran the caller off the roadway.’’11 The issue, as presented,
only leads to more questions. What factors demonstrate reliability? What is
a ‘‘sufficient’’ level of reliability? What kind of details must the caller provide?
Is the crime open or concealed?12 Does the crime alleged affect the level of
reliability required, or will the potential risk of harm outweigh the need for
reliability? Does the expectation of privacy of the suspect play a role?
Historically, courts have wrestled with these issues in attempting to lay out a
workable standard.
Unfortunately, the jurisprudence from the Supreme Court and state
supreme courts has been less than clear. Under the ‘‘totality of the
circumstances’’ test to determine reasonable suspicion,13 every fact is
relevant. The courts have provided guidance through case law, adjusting and
refining the standard over time. But the courts can take months to determine
whether a particular set of facts provided reasonable suspicion; law
enforcement officers do not have that luxury. Often, an officer only has a

9. Id.
10. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). There was some indication at the
lower court that the anonymous tipster was a woman, beyond that the identity was unknown.
Id. at 1697 n.1.
11. Id. at 1688 (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent phrased the question as
‘‘whether the ‘content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability,’ gave the
officers reasonable suspicion that the driver of the truck . . . was committing an ongoing
crime.’’ Id. at 1693 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Note the
significant difference between the majority’s question, which looks at the reliability of an
allegation of a single instance of being run off the road, and the dissent’s question, which looks
at the reliability of an allegation of an ongoing crime. This is particularly relevant because the
Court relied heavily on the fact that driving while intoxicated is an ongoing crime.
12. See Andrew B. Kartchner, J.L.’s Time Bomb Still Ticking: How Navarette’s Narrow
Holding Failed to Address Important Issues Regarding Anonymous Tips, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 1,
16 (2014) (noting that a tip about a concealed crime is less reliable because it requires inside
information while an open crime is more reliable because it is visible to all).
13. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
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split-second to make that decision. There is no time to wait and investigate
further.
This note contends that the standard, as interpreted by Navarette v.
California, has created more confusion for law enforcement officers. This
note will first discuss the background of the Fourth Amendment in general,
as well as the progression of cases ‘‘resolving’’ anonymous tip and reasonable
suspicion issues. Second, this note will review state and federal circuit court
cases that have directly considered this issue, focusing mainly on the roles
that privacy and danger play in the analysis. Third, after analyzing the
opinion in Navarette, this note will examine the effect Navarette has had on
the lower courts and law enforcement. Finally, this note will conclude that
the Supreme Court did not resolve the issue, but rather made it more difficult
to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.
II. BACKGROUND
Drunk driving poses a very serious public threat; thousands of people are
killed every year as a result of drunk driving.14 The Supreme Court has
recognized, and no one can dispute, the state’s interest in preventing drunk
driving.15 On the other hand, it is indisputable that the Fourth Amendment
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.16 The relevant
question is whether an investigatory stop based on an anonymous tip of
drunk driving, without more, constitutes a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment. If the answer to that question is no, then what is
required of an anonymous tip in order for it to provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary to instigate an investigatory stop?
A. General History of the Fourth Amendment
The text of the Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
14. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., DOT HS 811 870, Traffic
Safety
Facts
2012
Data:
Alcohol-Impaired
Driving
(2013),
http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811870.pdf.
15. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (‘‘Media reports of alcoholrelated death and mutilation on the Nation’s roads are legion.’’).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25,
27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.17
The original impetus of the Fourth Amendment was the result of England’s
use of general warrants and writs of assistance in America.18 These warrants
and writs were open-ended and ‘‘issued without any suspicion of illegal
activity and permitted those holding a writ to go anywhere they chose.’’19
These writs allowed government officials to enter any home for any reason.
These arbitrary government invasions led the Framers to draft the Fourth
Amendment to protect the privacy of individuals.
The Framers divided the Fourth Amendment into two clauses: the
reasonableness clause and the warrant clause.20 The reasonableness clause
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, and the warrant clause requires
a warrant to be supported by probable cause.21 These clauses were intended
to protect individual privacy and curtail unrestrained government
intrusion.22 Justice Jackson stated that the ‘‘Fourth Amendment freedoms . .
. are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable
freedoms.’’23 Jackson believed Fourth Amendment rights were indispensable
because ‘‘[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.’’24
Historically, courts interpreted the Fourth Amendment to require the
police to obtain a warrant from the judiciary by demonstrating probable
cause to suspect that criminal activity may have occurred.25 That requirement
took the decision-making power out of the hands of the police, ‘‘whose
judgment is necessarily colored by their primary involvement in the often
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 32
(2008).
19. Id. at 28.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Id.
22. Colby J. Morrissey, Note, Anonymous Tips Reporting Drunk Driving: Rejecting A
Fourth Amendment Exception for Investigatory Traffic Stops, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 167, 171
(2010).
23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See also
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (‘‘No right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.’’).
24. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 180.
25. 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 191 (2015).
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competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’’26 But the Fourth Amendment
does not protect from all searches and seizures, only unreasonable searches
and seizures.27 Typically, to determine what is reasonable, courts conduct a
balancing test, weighing the individual’s right to privacy against the
legitimate interests of the government.28 Over time, the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment allowed law enforcement officers
to conduct protective searches under standards lower than probable cause,
such as reasonable suspicion.29 Additionally, in the course of balancing
interests, the Court has created numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement, such as the automobile exception.30
B. The Automobile Exception
In 1925, the Supreme Court first recognized an exception for searching
automobiles.31 Due to their mobility, the Court recognized the impracticality
of obtaining a warrant before a driver could move his vehicle out of the
jurisdiction.32 Therefore, in determining whether a warrantless search of an
auto was valid, the Court looked to whether ‘‘the seizing officer [had]
reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he
stop[ped] and seize[ed] ha[d] contraband . . . .’’33 Since then, however, courts
have further justified the automobile exception on the ground that ‘‘[t]he
public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles . . . .’’34
The decreased expectation of privacy is a result of both the government’s

26. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
27. Id. at 9 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
28. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (balancing the interests of the government in protecting
police officers and the individual’s interests in privacy).
29. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (allowing officers to make a brief inhome protective sweep in conjunction with a lawful arrest when an officer has reasonable
belief that he or she is in danger); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (allowing a
protective search of the passenger compartment of an automobile during a lawful investigatory
stop); Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (allowing officers to pat down a suspect to search for weapons
based on reasonable suspicion).
30. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (allowing an exception to the
warrant requirement to prevent the destruction of evidence); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (creating the plain view exception).
31. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id. at 156.
34. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
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compelling need to regulate roadways and the relatively open configuration
of vehicles.35
Indeed, so long as the officers have probable cause, the automobile
exception even extends so far as to allow officers to search every part of the
vehicle, including the contents of any containers the police may find.36
Further, if the driver of a vehicle is arrested, the officer may search the vehicle
without probable cause so long as the driver is in reaching distance of the
passenger compartment or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of the arrest.37 Because of the location-----an
automobile-----the courts have been lenient in finding searches and seizures
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
C. Terry v. Ohio
While the investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion has developed
over time, it originated in Terry v. Ohio.38 On October 31, 1963, a plainclothes
officer was patrolling the downtown streets when he noticed three
individuals acting suspiciously in a manner that he described as ‘‘casing a
job.’’39 After observing for a while, the officer detained the three individuals
and asked for their names.40 Because of his observations, and out of concern
for his own safety, the officer patted down the outside of their clothing and
found that two of the men were armed.41 After being charged with carrying a
concealed weapon,42 one of the men, Terry, attempted to suppress the
introduction of the weapons into evidence.43 The district court denied his
motion to suppress and Terry appealed.44
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression.45
The Court had to consider an entire area of police conduct: ‘‘necessarily swift
action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the
35. Id.
36. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
37. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
39. Id. at 5-6. The behavior consisted of individually walking back and forth and glancing
in a particular store window. After each individual made a walk-by, they would confer. This
behavior continued for 10-12 minutes. Id.
40. Id. at 6-7.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 7-8.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 9-10.
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beat.’’46 The Court decided that a police officer, having reasonable suspicion
that a suspect was armed and dangerous, could conduct a limited search for
weapons.47 As courts have interpreted Terry, it has come to stand for the
proposition that an officer can conduct a brief investigatory stop if the officer
has a ‘‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
[he has] stopped [is involved in] criminal activity.’’48 These investigatory
stops have come to be called ‘‘Terry stops.’’49 While a mere ‘‘hunch’’ is not
enough,50 courts have held that the standard is ‘‘obviously less’’ stringent than
probable cause.51 In Terry, the Court applied a balancing test, finding that the
state’s interest in officer safety outweighed the minimal intrusion on an
individual’s privacy.52
D. Alabama v. White
In Alabama v. White, the Supreme Court first considered the anonymous
tip and its effect on Terry stops.53 On April 22, 1987, law enforcement
received an anonymous tip that Vanessa White would leave her apartment at
a specific time, enter a specific car, and drive to a specific location, all while

46. Id. at 20.
47. Id. at 30.
48. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
49. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1697; Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000).
50. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
51. See, e.g., Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
To see the distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, or perhaps the
difficulty in distinguishing the two, consider the definitions used in New Jersey:
probable cause determinations require an assessment based on the totality of the
circumstances and an objective standard of reasonableness. Probable cause is
defined as a well-grounded suspicion that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed. It is more than a bare suspicion, but less than the legal evidence
necessary to convict beyond a reasonable doubt.
Robert Ramsey, Probable cause and reasonable suspicion, defined, NJ Drunk Driving L. § 16:7
(2015 ed.). Reasonable suspicion is defined as:
an objective level of proof that is deemed to be less than probable cause. In
determining whether an officer acts reasonably in circumstances where this level
of proof is required, the court must give weight to specific, reasonable inferences
which the officer is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his or her
experience. An officer’s inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch is
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish a reasonable suspicion.
Id.
52. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30.
53. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
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carrying a brown attaché case containing cocaine.54 Responding officers
proceeded to the apartment, and saw the described car in the parking lot.
Shortly after, at the prescribed time, the officers watched as White came out
of the apartment, without any attaché case, and entered the vehicle.55 The
officers corroborated the tip by following White as she drove the most direct
route to the location the anonymous caller had identified.56 Just before White
turned into the location, the officers instigated an investigatory stop.57
Recognizing that ‘‘an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the
informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity,’’58 the Court concluded it was
nevertheless possible for an ‘‘anonymous caller [to] provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary for a Terry stop.’’59 Noting that reasonable suspicion is
‘‘obviously less demanding than . . . probable cause,’’60 the Court proceeded
to consider both the quantity and quality of information provided by the
anonymous tip.61 Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Court
found that law enforcement was able to corroborate the innocent details of
the tip through observation.62 More importantly, however, the officers were
able to corroborate White’s destination.63 This was important for two
reasons. First, and most important, the tip contained predictive details that
were not ‘‘easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip,
but [informed law enforcement of] future actions of third parties ordinarily
not easily predicted.’’64 This was important because it demonstrated that the
informant had inside knowledge and a ‘‘special familiarity with [the
suspect’s] affairs.’’65 This information allowed the police to make an
54. Id. at 327.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 329. The Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Illinois v. Gates, a case that
dealt with anonymous tips in the probable cause context. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
59. White, 496 U.S. at 329.
60. Id. at 330.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 331.
63. Id. While the officers stopped White just before the reported destination, the fact that
she travelled the most direct route, which required numerous turns and spanned four miles,
was sufficient to corroborate the destination. Id.
64. Id. at 332. This discussion of descriptive information led many of the lower courts to
find that an informant’s ability to ‘‘predict’’ the location and direction of a moving car was
sufficient to constitute ‘‘predictive information’’ and therefore give the tip sufficient reliability.
See, e.g., State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000).
65. White, 496 U.S. at 332.
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assumption that a person having such ‘‘information is likely to also have
access to reliable information about the [suspect’s] illegal activities.’’66
Second, the Court noted that when the ‘‘informant is shown to be right about
some things, [it means] he is probably right about other facts that he has
alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal
activity,’’ and therefore the Court imparted ‘‘some degree of reliability to the
other allegations made by the caller.’’67 Under these circumstances, the Court
held that the anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to create the reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify the stop, but that it was a ‘‘close case.’’68
For the next ten years, White was the leading case on anonymous tips
providing reasonable suspicion. In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Florida
v. J.L.,69 an opinion that would lead both the lower federal courts and state
supreme courts into disagreement as to its application.
E. The Beginning of the Problem: Florida v. J.L. and the ‘‘Exceptions’’ to
Reliability
In Florida v. J.L., the Court concluded that an anonymous tip was not
reliable enough to justify an investigatory stop.70 In J.L., the police received
an anonymous tip that ‘‘a young black male standing at a particular bus stop
66. Id. This also goes to the previously mentioned distinction between open and
concealed crimes. While reporting a concealed crime would be more unreliable, it was
sufficiently reliable in White because of the predictive information provided.
67. Id. at 331-32.
68. Id. at 332. While the majority found that the call was sufficiently reliable, Justice
Stevens dissented. Id. at 333 (Stevens, J. dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that people have
routines as to departure and probable destination such that their neighbors could accurately
predict their movements without knowing they are in possession of an illegal substance. Id.
Justice Stevens further states that:
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of
a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a
tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa White’s excursion. In addition,
under the Court’s holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned
by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on
an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed.
Fortunately, the vast majority of those in our law enforcement community would
not adopt such a practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect
the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as well as from those
who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mockery of that
protection.
Id.
69. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
70. Id. at 268.
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and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.’’71 The record in the case was
unclear as to how long after the call it was before the officers received
instruction to respond,72 however, it was probably soon after because the
officers located the individual when they arrived. Although the officers did
not see a firearm or unusual movements, one of the officers approached J.L.,
the young man in the plaid shirt, and frisked him.73 The officer discovered
that J.L. was carrying a firearm, as reported by the anonymous caller,74 and
charged him with carrying a concealed firearm without a permit and for
possessing a firearm under the age of eighteen.75
The Court held that the tip lacked even the moderate indicia of reliability
that was present in White.76 The information provided was sufficient in a
limited sense, as ‘‘[i]t [would] help the police correctly identify the person
whom the tipster [meant] to accuse.’’77 Reasonable suspicion, however,
‘‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its
tendency to identify a determinate person.’’78 The tip provided in J.L. did not
fit in that category because it did not contain predictive information, as White
did, that would allow the police to corroborate or test the informant’s
knowledge or credibility.79
Notably, the Supreme Court firmly rejected an automatic firearms
exception to the reliability requirement.80 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the
danger of firearms, and the risk that armed criminals may pose to the
public.81 However, an automatic exception would ‘‘rove too far’’ for two
primary reasons.82 First, it would allow any individual to ‘‘set in motion an
intrusive, embarrassing police search of the targeted person simply by placing
71. Id.
72. Id. However, given that the suspects were still at the bus stop, it is likely that the call
was contemporaneous. The officers arrived at the bus stop six minutes after receiving the
instruction to respond. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 269.
76. Id. at 271.
77. Id. at 272.
78. Id. (citing 4. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h), at 213 (3d ed. 1996)
(distinguishing reliability as to identification, which is often important in other criminal law
contexts, from reliability as to the likelihood of criminal activity, which is central in
anonymous-tip cases.)).
79. Id. at 271.
80. Id. at 272.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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an anonymous call . . . .’’83 Second, the exception could not be securely
confined to firearms, but would likely carry to other areas such as possession
of illegal drugs.84
After expressly rejecting an automatic firearm exception, the Court went
on to state that:
[t]he facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous
tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing
of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person
carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for
a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can
constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor do we hold that public safety
officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth
Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports and schools,
cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information
insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.85
This short statement led to two exceptions: (1) where the danger is so great
the normal reliability is not required, and (2) where privacy interests are
lower. Ironically, despite the Court’s express concerns about the inability to
limit an exception to firearms, lower courts have relied on the above
statement from J.L. as the basis for considering a drunk driving exception.86
This statement created an inconsistency and the lower courts split in
determining what level of reliability was required for anonymous tips of
driving under the influence.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 273.
85. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In discussing situations
where the reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished such that the same level of reliability
is not required, the Court cites to two cases: Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984) and New
Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985). However, in both cases, the Court still required reasonable
suspicion. In New Jersey v. TLO, the Court affirmed a search of a student’s purse because the
school had a reasonable belief that the student was, or had been, committing a crime. 469 U.S.
at 341-342. In Florida v. Rodriguez, the Court assumed, without deciding, that a seizure had
occurred, and found that it was justified by reasonable suspicion. 469 U.S. at 6 (using the term
articulable suspicion interchangeably with reasonable suspicion).
86. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 2001); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d
862, 868 (Vt. 2000).
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III. THE PROBLEM
A. The Lower Courts Split
Following J.L., the lower courts struggled to find a consistent
interpretation and application of the standard. The majority of states
considering the issue relied heavily on the scenarios outlined in J.L., finding
that the danger of drunk driving and the reduced privacy expectation in
automobiles justified the investigatory stops.87 Despite these conclusions,
these courts stopped short of creating an express drunk driving exception,
but in applying balancing tests heavily weighted the privacy and danger
concerns, essentially creating an exception in application. A small number of
courts appeared to apply a more traditional reliability test.88 The more
traditional test is a totality of the circumstances test, considering the privacy
and danger equally with other circumstances.
1. The majority position: Acknowledging the grave danger and
reduced expectation of privacy involved in drunk driving scenarios
Since an express exception was not created by J.L., the courts still required
some showing of reliability in an anonymous tip situation. What level of
reliability should be required, however, continues to be an open question.
Specifically, for anonymous tips about drunk driving, the question is whether
an anonymous tip, which would ordinarily be insufficient to justify a search,
would be sufficient in the drunk driving context to fit a J.L. exception.
Presumably, because drunk driving fits into the J.L. exceptions, the courts
required a lower showing of reliability. At the very least, the grave danger and
reduced privacy exceptions played a role in determining the reliability in each
case-----either because the courts simply required a reduced level of reliability,
or because they gave greater weight to information that the anonymous caller
did provide in finding that there was grave danger.89

87. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736-37; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815-16 (Cal. 2006);
Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Del. 2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 724
(Haw. 2004); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 119 (Kan. 2003); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d
625, 630 (Iowa 2001); State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 519, 527-28 (Wis. 2001); Boyea, 765
A.2d at 867-68.
88. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 208-09 (Iowa 2013); Harris v. Commonwealth, 668
S.E.2d 141, 147 (Va. 2008); State v. Lee, 938 P.2d 637, 640 (Mont. 1997); State v. Miller, 510
N.W.2d 638, 645 (N.D. 1994).
89. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 736-37; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815-16 (Cal. 2006).
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a. Drunk driving is a grave and imminent danger
(1) State v. Boyea
In 2000, the same year J.L. was decided, the Vermont Supreme Court
became the first court to apply the J.L. exceptions in the context of an
anonymous tip of drunk driving.90 The court emphasized the danger of
driving under the influence from the very first words of the opinion. The
court sketched out the facts-----an anonymous report of a specific vehicle, in a
specific location, operating erratically-----and posed two alternative
scenarios.91 In the first scenario, the officer pulled the vehicle over as soon as
possible, ‘‘revealing a driver with a blood alcohol level nearly three times the
legal limit and a prior DUI conviction.’’92 In the second scenario, the officer
followed the vehicle in an attempt to corroborate the report, but eventually
abandoned the surveillance. The driver then veered into oncoming traffic
and caused an accident.93 The court determined that the gravity of potential
harm must be considered, and that the officer’s ability to wait and observe
incriminating behavior was limited by the exigency of the situation.94 The
result of drunk driving is ‘‘‘death and destruction on the highways. This is not
a risk which the Fourth Amendment requires the public to take.’’’95 Holding
with the tone of the hypothetical, the court distinguished a drunk driver from
the concealed firearm in J.L. by describing a drunk driver as ‘‘not at all unlike
a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at that.’’96
(2) United States v. Wheat
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the lead of the Vermont
Supreme Court. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court had expressly
rejected both a firearm exception and the idea that confirmation of visual
attributes provided sufficient corroboration, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless
concluded that the anonymous tip provided sufficient reliability to create
reasonable suspicion. 97 The court found an anonymous report that a driver
was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and driving
like a ‘‘complete maniac,’’ likely established that there was a drunk driver
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 864-65 (quoting State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 340 (N.H. 1995)).
Id. at 865 (quoting State v. Tucker, 878 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994)).
Id. at 867.
United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001).
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posing ‘‘an imminent threat to public safety.’’98 The critical difference
between a drunk driver and a report of a concealed weapon is that an officer
responding to a report of drunk driving does not have a less invasive option.
Unlike a drunk driving situation, an officer responding to a possessory
offense, such as firearm possession, may initiate a simple consensual
encounter or quietly observe the individual for a period of time.99 Despite the
presence of numerous other factors weighing in favor of the defendant’s
privacy, including that the officers had only corroborated visual attributes
and not the illegality of the defendant’s conduct, the court heavily weighted
the danger of the defendant’s alleged offense in its analysis.
(3) People v. Wells
In Wells, the CHP received a report of a ‘‘possibly intoxicated driver
‘weaving all over the roadway.’’’100 This is one of the few cases where the caller
actually indicated that the driver may have been intoxicated; in other cases,
the anonymous callers simply described the driver’s behavior. In Wells, the
responding officer did not observe any erratic or suspicious behavior prior to
stopping the van.101 Since the officer followed the van and did not observe
erratic driving, one would expect that the reliability of the anonymous tip
would decrease. Yet the California Supreme Court concluded that an
anonymous tip was sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion if: (1)
the tipster supplies sufficient identifying information regarding the vehicle
and its location, and (2) the tip indicates the caller witnessed a
contemporaneous traffic violation, rather than mere speculation as to
unlawful activity, and (3) at least the ‘‘innocent details’’ of the tip are
corroborated by the officers.102 Further, the court agreed that drunk driving
was a more serious risk than ‘‘passive gun possession,’’103 and that ‘‘[p]olice
officers undoubtedly would be severely criticized for failing to stop and
investigate a reported drunk driver if an accident subsequently occurred.’’104

98. Id. at 724, 736.
99. Id. at 736.
100. People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 811 (Cal. 2006).
101. Id. at 812.
102. Id. at 815.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court further states that the ‘‘public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire
into such circumstances . . . .’’ Id. But the Fourth Amendment is not based on what the public
expects. For example, the people expect the police to arrest and charge a murderer, but in some
circumstances the discovery of a murder weapon or other important evidence is excluded if
law enforcement officers fail to comply with the Fourth Amendment. Instead it is based on a
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The three cases discussed above are just a small sampling of cases coming
to the same conclusion. Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable
cause, drunk driving is an extreme danger to the public, and drunk driving is
nothing like a firearm. These courts concluded that drunk driving is not
bound by J.L., but rather falls into the hypothetical posed by Justice Ginsburg
requiring a lower showing of reliability. Despite considering other factors,
each court relied primarily on the grave danger drunk driving posed to the
public.
b. Individuals have a reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle
Although the lower courts found that driving under the influence was
sufficiently dangerous to fit into the first J.L. exception, they went one step
further to find that driving under the influence also fit within the second
alleged exception: a reduced expectation of privacy. The courts did not
explain whether the reduced expectation of privacy alone was enough to
establish reliability, or whether it was reduced privacy in conjunction with
the dangers of drunk driving. The courts nonetheless found that the tips were
sufficiently reliable. In State v. Boyea, the court described the seizure in
driving under the influence cases as ‘‘a simple motor vehicle stop, a
temporary and brief detention that is exposed to public view.’’105 This
minimal intrusion did not rise to the level of a ‘‘hands-on violation of the
person’’ that was present in J.L.106 Similarly, the California Supreme Court
found that the ‘‘level of intrusion of personal privacy and inconvenience
involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than [an] embarrassing
police search on a public street.’’107 Further, in keeping with the language of
the second exception in J.L., the court stated that ‘‘individuals generally have
a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public
thoroughfares.’’108
The reasoning by these courts is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the automobile exception. However, if the reduced
expectation of privacy in an automobile was, by itself, enough to reduce the
level of reliability required, then it would seem that an anonymous tip
reporting any crime involving an automobile would automatically be entitled
to greater weight in a reasonable suspicion analysis. For example, an
balancing test of the individual right invaded and the government interest, regardless of public
expectations. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1960).
105. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id. See also Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (vehicular stops ‘‘are considerably less invasive,
both physically and psychologically, than the frisk on a public corner . . . .’’).
107. Wells, 136 P.3d at 816 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
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anonymous report of texting while driving or speeding would provide the
officer with reasonable suspicion for a stop-----because both actions took place
in a car. Despite the significance that the courts gave to privacy in the
analysis, the discussion in State v. Boyea was relegated to a few short
sentences.
Despite the lack of discussion, it is clear from the above cases that the
reduced expectation of privacy played a significant role in the outcome of the
case. These holdings provided a consistency for law enforcement officers.
Regardless of whether a ‘‘drunk driving exception’’ was created, officers could
at least rely on the fact that an anonymous tip of drunk driving was sufficient
to provide reasonable suspicion. At the very least, the standard was a clear
rule for officers to enforce. The focus on weighing privacy interests against
grave danger fell closely in line with the traditional Fourth Amendment
balancing test: privacy interests of the individual against the government’s
interest. In these cases, the test came out in favor of the government. Other
courts, however, weighed the balance and came out in favor of the individual.
2. The minority position: Focusing less on the danger and more on
the totality of the circumstances
Other jurisdictions allocated less significance to the danger and privacy
interest exceptions from J.L. and applied what appears to be a more
traditional totality of the circumstances test. In fact, these courts found other
factors relevant in determining that reasonable suspicion did not exist when
based on the anonymous tip.
a. Harris v. Commonwealth
In Harris, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that an anonymous
tip sufficiently describing a vehicle that was subsequently located by law
enforcement was insufficient to justify a stop. In addition to describing the
vehicle and the location, the anonymous tipster went so far as to provide the
name of the driver, describe the shirt the driver was wearing, and provided a
partial license plate number.109 When the officer located the vehicle, he
noticed that the plate number was similar but not identical to the one
reported.110 The officer followed the vehicle for a short time and did not
notice the vehicle swerving, exceeding the posted speed, or otherwise acting
suspicious.111
109. Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 144 (Va. 2008).
110. Id. The caller reported that the license plate contained Y8066 while the license of the
vehicle pulled over was YAR-8046. Id.
111. Id.
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The court ultimately concluded that the anonymous source was not
sufficiently reliable.112 The call did not contain predictive information
sufficient to allow the officer to verify the informant’s credibility.113 The court
noted that an anonymous tip does not require predictive information if the
informant was reporting readily observable information.114 ‘‘However, the
crime of driving while intoxicated is not readily observable unless the
suspected driver operates his or her vehicle in some fashion objectively
indicating that the driver is intoxicated; such conduct must be observed
before an investigatory stop is justified.’’115 The anonymous caller merely
reported that the driver was drunk, but did not allege any behavior such as
weaving or swerving.116 Since the conduct was not readily observable, and the
officer himself did not witness any suspicious activity, the officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to instigate an investigatory stop.117
The Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States,
but its petition for certiorari was denied.118 Chief Justice Roberts dissented
from the denial, arguing that the rule would ‘‘grant drunk drivers ‘one free
swerve’ before they can legally be pulled over by police,’’ and that it would be
‘‘difficult for an officer to explain to the family of a motorist killed by that
swerve that the police had a tip that the driver of the other car was drunk, but
that they were powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check.’’119 Even
here, the danger presented by drunk driving plays an important role in
Roberts’ dissent. His concerns followed the same refrain as the lower federal
courts that driving under the influence is dangerous and, therefore, officers
should be able to act on anonymous tips. Yet there was little mention of
reliability or an individual’s right to privacy. Chief Justice Roberts even noted
that anti-drunk driving policies had frequently been upheld, despite the fact
112. Id. at 147.
113. Id. at 146. This is contradictory to Boyea, where the court found that the ability to
‘‘predict’’ the location of a moving vehicle was sufficient predictive information. State v. Boyea,
765 A.2d 862, 867 (2000).
114. Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) (citing Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 603 (Va. 2004)).
115. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146.
116. Id. at 144.
117. Id. at 147. The officer reported that the driver stayed within the posted speed limit
and did not swerve at any time. Id. However, the officer did observe the driver brake at three
different times before voluntarily pulling the vehicle to the side of the road. Id. While the
behavior was unusual, the court noted that the officer did not describe it as erratic, nor does it
indicate involvement in the criminal act of driving under the influence. Id.
118. Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 (2009).
119. Id. at 981.
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that the policies would have been ‘‘constitutionally problematic’’ in other
circumstances.120 Based on his dissent, it would appear Roberts was
suggesting that there should be a lower standard for anonymous tips of drunk
driving.
b. State v. Kooima: Pre-cursor to Navarette?
A decade after the Iowa Supreme Court followed a reduced reliability
requirement,121 that court decided to focus less on the danger of drunk
driving and more on the anonymous tip itself. 122 In making its decision, the
court collected and analyzed all the relevant cases and identified three
elements that seemed to be present in all cases where the anonymous tip was
sufficiently reliable: (1) the anonymous caller provided ‘‘an accurate
description of the vehicle, including its location, so the police could identify
the vehicle,’’ (2) the information had to be based on ‘‘personal, eyewitness
information [that was] made contemporaneously with a crime in progress,’’
and (3) the caller had to describe specific traffic violations, which would
indicate that the allegation was more than a mere hunch.123 In looking for
eyewitness information, the court was in line with White and J.L., where the
basis of the anonymous tipster’s knowledge was important to the reliability
determination.
Kooima left law enforcement in the difficult position of deciding whether
the same factors would play a role in anonymous tips of other crimes. Would
an anonymous tip of texting and driving be sufficient? It is still a specific
traffic violation, an eyewitness can see it, and the same identifying
information could be provided. Or are police required to have a little
something more before reasonable suspicion exists? This case served as a precursor to Navarette, which was decided the following year.
IV. DID NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA REALLY SOLVE THE PROBLEM?
As usual, the Supreme Court had to resolve the split among the circuits
and state supreme courts. On one side, the majority of jurisdictions were
overwhelmingly concerned with the danger of drunk driving. On the other
side, a minority of jurisdictions attempted to apply the totality of the
120. Id. at 978. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496
U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (allowing roadside check stops without an individualized finding of
reasonable suspicion).
121. See State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001).
122. State v. Kooima, 833 N.W.2d 202, 208 (Iowa 2013).
123. Id. at 208-209. The three factors laid out in Kooima are very similar to the factors
eventually applied by the Supreme Court in Navarette.
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circumstances test as if driving under the influence was the same as any other
crime. Which still left the question: what is required for an anonymous tip to
provide reasonable suspicion? One would have expected the court to answer
this question; indeed, based on the petition for certiorari, as well as the briefs
and oral arguments, the parties before the Court also expected the question
to be answered.124 The Court, however, declined to fully answer it.125 Instead,
Navarette was only intended to answer whether an officer had to corroborate
dangerous driving before stopping a vehicle on the basis of an anonymous
tip.126 The Court’s answer, unfortunately, only spawned more confusion. The
Court held that corroboration of an anonymous tip is not required. If
corroboration was not required, but the stop was still permissible, it
necessarily means that the reasonable suspicion justifying the stop existed
prior to corroboration. If that it true, then the reasonable suspicion was
provided only by the anonymous tip and discovery of the reported vehicle at
the location reported. Accordingly, one would still expect some discussion of
the relevant factors, and the Court did indeed discuss the factors making the
tip reliable. However, the inherent danger of driving under the influence and
the reduced privacy expectation in vehicles were not the prevalent factors.
A Bright Line Totality of the Circumstances Test
The majority firmly rejected the idea that reasonable suspicion had to be
based on an officer’s own observations, rather than on the observations or
information of other individuals.127 Therefore, corroboration is not always
necessary. The Court outlined three specific factors that made this particular
anonymous tip reliable. First, the court determined that the eyewitness had
claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving.128
124. Two questions were presented to the court:
1. Does the Fourth Amendment require an officer who receives an
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate dangerous
driving before stopping the vehicle?
2. Does an anonymous tip that a specific vehicle ran someone off the road
provide reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, where the detaining officer was
only advised to be on the lookout for a reckless driver, and the officer could not
corroborate dangerous driving despite following the suspect vehicle for several
miles?
Petition for certiorari, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
125. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting cert only as to the first question
presented).
126. Id.
127. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2014).
128. Id. at 1689.

126

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:107

Accordingly, the Court accorded greater weight to the tip.129 Second, the
anonymous tip appeared to be contemporaneous with the event because the
vehicle was located only a short distance from where it was reported only
eighteen minutes after the call.130 This contemporaneity negated the
likelihood that the tip was deliberately misrepresented or a prank of some
sort.131 The third and final factor was the use of the 911 emergency call
system.132 The Court believed that the technological capabilities of the 911
system-----such as the ability to record, transcribe, and trace-----made the call
more reliable.133 Additionally, the Court stated that the anonymous call must
report ‘‘more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a conclusory
allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, [the caller must] allege[] a
specific and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct.’’134 Finally the Court
noted that it was a report of an ongoing crime.135
Despite declaring that it was applying a totality of the circumstances test,
Justice Scalia rightly noted that, in reality, the Court stated a new rule that
law enforcement would be quick to realize. 136 ‘‘So long as the caller identifies
where the car is, anonymous 911 calls reporting a single instance of possibly
careless or reckless driving will support a traffic stop.’’137 This is where the
129. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 416 (1969)).
130. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689. Contemporaneity refers to the time between the incident
reported and the actual report to law enforcement.
131. Id. The Court made reference to the present sense impressions and excited utterance
exceptions to the hearsay rule and the rationale behind those exceptions. See FED. R. EVID.
803(1) & (2):
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether
the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.
Interestingly, although the Court uses these rules to support the reliability of the tip, Justice
Scalia points out that the comments to the Rules indicate hesitancy in applying these
exceptions when the declarant is unknown. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. Id., 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
133. Id. at 1689-90. The Court did note, however, that the use of the 911 system did not
make the call per se reliable, but ‘‘a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would
think twice before using such a system.’’ Id. at 1690.
134. Id. at 1691 (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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difficulty for law enforcement comes in: is Navarette’s holding a rule with
three elements, or is it a totality of the circumstances test where even if those
factors are present, other factors may outweigh them?
But several factors are present here that should at least raise concern as to
whether the Court’s three factors are sufficient for reliability. The conduct
reported was only that a vehicle had run the anonymous caller off of the
roadway, not that the driver was drunk.138 Yet it was important to the Court’s
decision that the caller reported an ongoing crime.139 The Court concluded
that specific conduct such as weaving, crossing the centerline, or as in this
case, running someone off the road, is the type of erratic behavior that the
‘‘accumulated experience of thousands of officers’’ suggests is ‘‘strongly
correlated with drunk driving.’’140 Other signs, such as speeding or not
wearing a seatbelt would not be sufficient. And yet, under the Court’s
reasoning, not wearing a seatbelt is an ongoing traffic violation. Imagine that
an anonymous caller described a vehicle and location, alleged that the driver
was not wearing a seatbelt, and used the 911 system. Would it be sufficient to
justify a traffic stop if the officer located the vehicle? Under Navarette the
officer would not be required to justify the stop. But that seems ridiculous.
Shouldn’t the seriousness or danger of the alleged wrongdoing matter? And
why does saying someone swerved on the road make a tip reliable, but saying
someone is driving drunk does not? In any case, the reliability of an
anonymous phone call, at least in this case, is based on an inference that a
single instance of someone swerving on the road means that the driver is
intoxicated.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia points out that the officer had good reason to
know that the tip was unreliable, or to question its reliability, because the
officer followed the truck for five minutes without seeing any suspicious
behavior.141 Discounting that idea, the Court found it eminently reasonable
that the presence of a marked police car would inspire careful driving.142
While following a suspect for an extended time may dispel reasonable
suspicion, the mere five minutes in this case was not sufficient.143 Justice
Scalia countered that the ability of a drunk driver to drive carefully, simply
because he observes a police car, undermines the very danger of drunk
driving: the effects of intoxication on the body-----’’effects that no mere act of
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 1686-87 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1690.
Id. at 1691.
Id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1691 (majority opinion).
Id.
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the will can resist.’’144 Failure to repeat the alleged traffic violation should be
significant.
Finally, the Court seemed to discount the entire problem with anonymous
tips in the first place. Anonymous individuals cannot be held accountable for
their actions.145 The anonymity is especially relevant in this case, because
though the tipster claimed eyewitness knowledge, the information provided
was of the type that ‘‘everyone in the world who saw the car would have’’ and
‘‘anyone who wanted the car stopped would have to provide that
information.’’146 The point being, if someone wanted to play a prank or harass
an individual, they could do so simply by providing this information.
Providing the general location of a vehicle on the road is not the same quality
of predictive information generally credited to insiders, and it does not allow
the officer to certify the veracity of the tip. The Court simply stated that
reasonable suspicion merely provides the means to investigate; it does not
preclude the possibility of innocent behavior.147
Discounting these problems, the Court determined the call was
sufficiently reliable based on the three factors discussed above. Accordingly,
because this reliable call alleged an ‘‘ongoing’’ crime, the officer had
reasonable suspicion to stop the car. The Court spent little time or attention
discussing the danger of driving while intoxicated and the privacy
expectations in an automobile. In fact, the Court’s mention of danger was
limited to one sentence stating that this would be an inappropriate context to
require an officer to use less intrusive investigatory techniques ‘‘because
allowing a drunk driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could have
disastrous consequences.’’148
IV. SO WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US?: ANALYSIS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF NAVARETTE
The Supreme Court has spoken. There is only one problem: what did it
say? What is the state of anonymous calls after Navarette? The Court clearly
144. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 1692 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 385 (1995)).
146. Id. at 1693. Regardless of whether the call can be traced, what matters is the view of
the caller. If the caller believes that the call is anonymous, he believes he is escaping
accountability, notwithstanding the reality of whether the call is traceable. As Justice Scalia
notes, ‘‘When does a victim complain to the police about an arguably criminal act (running
the victim off the road) without giving his identity, so that he can accuse and testify when the
culprit is caught?’’ Id.
147. Id. at 1691 (citing United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).
148. Id. at 1691-92.

2015]

NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA

129

states that it subscribes to a totality of the circumstances test for reasonable
suspicion. But does it really? In finding reliability, the Court pointed to three
important factors: (1) the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge;
(2) the call was contemporaneous; and (3) the caller used the 911 call
system.149 The question becomes, then, did the Court unintentionally create
a bright-line rule for reliability? Does it apply only to anonymous tips alleging
driving under the influence? Or is it a rule that can be used in other
circumstances? Did the danger of driving while intoxicated play any role? Did
the reduced privacy expectation play any role?
After determining that the call was reliable, the only other circumstance
present was that the anonymous caller alleged something other than a
conclusory allegation, something a reasonable officer would know suggests
drunk driving.150 Since Navarette was characterized as a ‘‘close case,’’ it would
seem that any anonymous call would have to have, at minimum, the three
factors present in Navarette in order to be reliable. It then follows that if the
call has those three factors and the allegation was some driving activity
symptomatic of drunk driving, then reasonable suspicion exists. Fourth
Amendment tests tend towards being totality of the circumstances test.
Indeed, under Navarette, the Court still applied this rule like a totality of the
circumstances test. Yet, going forward this rule appears to function more like
a bright-line rule.
A. The Confusion Persists: Interpreting Navarette
Since Navarette was decided in April 2014, 217 cases have cited to it.151
Many cases simply cite it for standards such as the totality of the
circumstances test. Others, however, have applied the test like a bright-line
rule. Take, for example, United States v. Edwards from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.152 Edwards was arrested after an anonymous tipster called
149. Id. at 1688-90.
150. Id. at 1691.
151. As of January 11, 2016.
152. United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2014). Additionally, in Jackson v.
United States, the court considered an anonymous report that a man with a gun was at a bus
stop. 109 A.3d 1105, 1106 (D.C. 2015). The anonymous caller provided a location and
description, but when the officer arrived at the bus stop she did not see anyone nearby. Id. She
did, however, see someone matching the description a short way up the street. Id. The only
real difference between Jackson and Florida v. J.L., is that the eyewitness caller in Jackson
specifically stated that she had seen the gun. Because the caller claimed eyewitness knowledge
and used the 911 system, the court concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion for the
stop. Id. at 1108. In J.L., the facts simply state that the anonymous caller reported to the police
department. 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
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911 to report a shooting.153 He was found in the vicinity of the reported
shooting and matched the description of the suspect.154 In deciding that
reasonable suspicion existed, the court mechanically applied the Navarette
factors; the tip was a ‘‘911 call from an eyewitness reporting an ongoing and
dangerous situation,’’155 therefore, the officer was reasonable in relying on the
anonymous tip.156 The Ninth Circuit categorized an ongoing shooting
situation as ‘‘even more dangerous than the suspected drunk driving in
Navarette.’’157 Despite the mechanical application, this statement indicates
that the danger of the crime continues to play a role.
A Texas court suggested that Navarette did not create a new rule, but
simply applied Fourth Amendment precedent to the facts existing in that
case.158 But that court still proceeded to use the factors outlined as a brightline rule for determining reliability.159 Courts have even used the factors in
cases where the call was not anonymous to bolster the reliability.160
While a bright-line rule would perhaps make things easier for law
enforcement, the use of this particular rule overwhelms any expectation of
privacy and renders the Fourth Amendment protections useless, since almost
any 911 call can be used to provide the necessary reasonable suspicion----especially if courts broadly interpret any of the three factors.161 For example,
in United States v. Robinson, an anonymous call was placed to the police
department and the secretary transferred the call to an officer to investigate
further.162 Because the tipster claimed eyewitness knowledge, which was
contemporaneous, the court stated the call contained sufficient indicia of
reliability.163 In discounting the fact that the call was not placed through the
911 system, the court noted that it was ‘‘still much more than a ‘bare-boned’
tip about guns like the J.L. tip.’’164 Instead of acknowledging that the
153. Edwards, 761 F.3d. at 979.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 984.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Waldon v. Stephens, No. H-13-3752, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181230, at *28
n.2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2014).
159. Id. at *26-27.
160. See, e.g., Tankersley v. State, 453 S.W.3d 699 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015).
161. Kit Kinports, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion: Totality Tests or Rigid Rules?,
163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 75, 85 (2014).
162. United States v. Robinson, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112383, at *1 (N.D.
W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014).
163. Id. at *7-8.
164. Id. at *9.
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Navarette case was a close case and the lack of the use of the 911 system could
make the difference between a reliable and unreliable anonymous tip, the
district court instead chose to distinguish J.L.165
Similarly, in United States v. Aviles-Vega, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals broadly interpreted the 911 factor, finding that a call to a desk
sergeant was sufficiently reliable due to other circumstances.166 The ongoing
crime requirement was interpreted differently as well. The crime alleged in
Aviles-Vega was that two passengers of a vehicle openly passed a pistol
between them.167 Because Puerto Rico is a concealed carry jurisdiction, the
court determined that the open passing was a crime sufficient to pass the
test.168 The facts, however, do not indicate whether the pistol was then
concealed or whether it remained in the open. Had the pistol been
immediately concealed, the crime would no longer be ongoing, and,
therefore, would be distinguishable from Navarette. The court did not
mention privacy expectations, but had an opportunity to do so, considering
the crime occurred in an automobile.
This sampling of cases indicates that Navarette adopted a three-part test.
While not all jurisdictions apply each part identically, they are largely abiding
by the test. This again brings to the forefront the question: did the reduced
expectation of privacy and the danger of drunk driving play any role in
determining the reliability of the call? If it did not, then the rule should apply
across the spectrum of crimes. But if privacy and gravity of harm played any
role in reducing the amount of reliability required, which it at least appears
to have played some role, then the Court needs to clarify that issue.
Considering that reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is a
balancing of interests, and the Court consistently weighs the expectation of
privacy against the government’s interest, one would think that a balancing
test should play a role. And if it does play a role, then the factors from
Navarette should not be applied across the spectrum of the crimes. And yet,
Robinson, Alviles-Vegas, and Edwards did not involve driving under the
influence.
B. So How Does the Rule Apply Outside the Drunk Driving Context?
The test for whether an anonymous tip is reliable should be a consistent
standard regardless of what crime is reported. The facts and circumstances
165. Id.
166. United States v. Aviles-Vega, 783 F.3d 69, 72, 76 (1st Cir. 2015).
167. Id. at 73.
168. Id. But see State v. Rodriguez, 852 N.W.2d 705, 714 (Neb. 2014) (recognizing that the
fact the reported crime was ongoing was critical to the outcome of Navarette).
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might change, the crime might change, but the standard should not. If the
factors that make an anonymous tip reliable are that it is an eyewitness and
contemporaneous account of a crime conveyed over the 911 system, then
those factors should make a call reliable regardless of what the crime is. The
only difference should be whether the call is sufficient to provide the
reasonable suspicion necessary to make the stop. Consider the following
hypothetical.169
An anonymous tipster places a call to 911 from a phone booth, giving a
reportedly contemporaneous eyewitness account that a man hit a woman,
retrieved a shotgun, and threatened the woman with the gun.170 When
officers respond to the call, the lights in the home are off and there is no
movement inside.171 Due to the ‘‘potentially significant threat to public
safety,’’ the police decide to treat the tip seriously, despite any question as to
the reliability of the call.172 Officers use a loudspeaker to coax the suspect out
of the house.173 The suspect complies, no weapons are found on him, and he
is placed in a patrol car.174 Police proceed to ask him questions and discover
that he unlawfully possesses a firearm.175
Under Navarette, the call is sufficiently reliable because the caller claimed
eyewitness knowledge to the crime, called contemporaneous to the incident,
and used the 911 call system. Because the police were easily able to locate the
home, much like the police in Navarette located the vehicle, it would appear
the police had reasonable suspicion to seize the man, just as the officers in
Navarette had reasonable suspicion to make the stop. This application treats
the Navarette rule like a bright line rule. But it does not deal with the major
differences. People undoubtedly have a greater expectation of privacy in their
homes than in their vehicles. A drunk driver on the road presents a far greater
169. The hypothetical is based on the facts and holding of the Court of Appeals of
Washington in State v. Saggers, 332 P.3d 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).
170. Id. at 1036. Thirty minutes prior to the anonymous tip, an identified individual had
called and informed officers that he needed to get his belongings from a home at the same
address where the incident occurred. During that call, the tipster had made a comment about
‘‘people having guns with domestic violence stuff.’’ Id. While this was relevant in the reliability
determination, it was not this information that led to the reasonable suspicion dissipating. Id.
at 1041. Though it is interesting to note that the Court found the use of the 911 system did not
increase the reliability of the anonymous tip because it was placed through a pay phone instead
of a cell phone. Id. at 1037.
171. Id. at 1036.
172. Id. at 1041.
173. Id. at 1037.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1037.
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danger to the public than does one armed man in a domestic dispute. Because
Navarette failed to discuss privacy and danger as factors, it appears that they
played an insignificant role in analyzing the stop. Yet, in the case in which
the above hypothetical is based, the court did take note of the danger to the
public.176 More significantly, the court determined that reasonable suspicion
had dissipated by the time the officer questioned the suspect about his
firearm. In Navarette, the Court found that following the vehicle for five
minutes without seeing any suspicious behavior did not dissipate the
reasonable suspicion.177
Even though the Court in Navarette noted observation might dispel
reasonable suspicion, the fact that the officer had followed the suspected
drunk driver for five minutes-----without noticing any signs of driving under
the influence-----did not dissipate the reasonable suspicion.178 The Court did
note that an extended observation might dispel reasonable suspicion.179
While the majority thought it reasonable to assume that an individual
spotting a patrol car would drive more carefully, as Justice Scalia pointed out,
the entire problem with intoxication is the lack of control over the body and
its reactions.180 If we assume it is reasonable that a driver may alter his or her
behavior for a time, it should be equally reasonable to assume that an
individual would have time to hide a firearm or alter his behavior upon
hearing police officers instruct him to come out of his home over a
loudspeaker.
This brings the argument full circle back to the question of why the same
inferences are permissible in the drunk driving context that are not
permissible in other contexts. This seems to bring us right back to Florida v.
J.L., except the Supreme Court has added an extra loop in the analysis. Does
the danger of an alleged crime play a role in the level of reliability and
reasonable suspicion required? Does the expectation of privacy an individual
has play any role in the level of reliability and reasonable suspicion? Despite
the fact that the issues were present in Navarette, the Supreme Court avoided
all discussion on the topic. The Court addressed the limited question of
whether the ‘‘Fourth Amendment require[s] an officer who receives an
anonymous tip regarding a drunken or reckless driver to corroborate
176. Id. at 1041.
177. Id. at 1040.
178. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2014).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the ‘‘‘sever[e] impair[ment]’ of ‘[b]alance,
speech, hearing, and reaction time,’ as well as one’s general ‘ability to drive a motor vehicle’’’
for individuals with blood alcohol content between 0.08 and 0.109) (internal citations
omitted).

134

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:107

dangerous driving before stopping the vehicle.’’181 Perhaps the Court was
trying to narrow its holding, but in doing so it failed to give any guidance to
the lower courts or to the law enforcement officers trying to navigate through
the murky waters of reasonable suspicion.182
C. How Does This Uncertainty Affect our Law Enforcement Officers?
The murky confusion of anonymous tips, reliability, and reasonable
suspicion wreak havoc on the ability of law enforcement officers to do their
jobs effectively. The role of law enforcement officers is ‘‘to Protect and to
Serve.’’183 This includes protecting the public from crime and danger, but also
extends to the protection of constitutional rights. In fact, the first level of
constitutional protection often comes from law enforcement officers. When
an officer is evaluating whether to conduct an investigatory stop, he must
balance the interests of the public against the privacy interests of the
individual, consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances, and make a
determination as to whether he has the required reasonable suspicion of a
crime. The voluminous court opinions evaluating each factor and its
significance reflect the difficulty of making these decisions. It becomes even
more difficult when an officer has to first determine whether an anonymous
tip is reliable. Even courts have struggled with and disagree about what goes
into this consideration. Now add to the officer’s predicament the time factor.
He must often make this decision in a matter of minutes-----sometimes even
seconds.
An unclear standard simply adds another layer of complexity to the
officer’s determinations, the officer is unsure of the outcome, and one of two
things may occur. First, an officer unsure of whether he has reasonable
suspicion may rush in and instigate a stop notwithstanding his uncertainties.
In this situation, an officer may just assume that it can be sorted out later. In
the second situation, an officer, unsure of whether reasonable suspicion
181. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). See also
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting certiorari limited to the first question
presented to the Court). Based on the briefs prepared by the Petitioner and Respondent, as
well as the oral arguments made, it appears counsel for both parties expected the danger and
automobile issues to be resolved. See Brief for Petitioner, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 129490); Brief for Respondent, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490); Transcript of Oral
Argument, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-9490_2cp3.pdf.
182. See Kartchner, supra note 12.
183. The Origin of the LAPD Motto, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,
http://www.lapdonline.org/history_of_the_lapd/content_basic_view/1128. (last visited Oct.
6, 2015).
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exists, may decide not to investigate further.184 In one instance, the Fourth
Amendment rights of individuals will be repeatedly trampled. In the other,
the constitutional rights are protected, but numerous individuals may get
away with dangerous crimes.
This problem can be seen in the wake of the Ferguson protests.185
Obviously being pulled over based on an anonymous tip is not the same as
racial discrimination. My point is simply that when individuals do not know
what standard the police are applying, or believe that the police are applying
unfair standards, tension arises between the public and law enforcement.
People stop trusting police officers and those same police officers go on the
defensive, especially when those officers perceive a lack of support from
government officials. Notably, the arrest rate in New York dropped
significantly compared with other years following the death of Eric Garner.186
Most attribute the decrease to a protest by the officers over the mayor’s lack
of political support,187 and they are probably right. But the point is that as
tensions rose, an increasingly unstable and distrustful relationship developed
between law enforcement and the public.
Now let’s transplant that into the anonymous tips in the drunk driving
context. Officers have to determine whether a call is reliable and whether
reasonable suspicion exists. They have to take what guidance they have from
the courts and apply that standard. If the rule set out in Navarette was a
bright-line rule, then applying the standard, at least in the drunk driving
context, would undoubtedly be easier. But if it is not a bright-line rule, then
184. See George M. Dery III & Kevin Meehan, The Devil is in the Details: The Supreme
Court Erodes the Fourth Amendment in Applying Reasonable Suspicion in Navarette v.
California, 21 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 275, 296-97 (2015) (contending that the
erosion of the Fourth Amendment leads to passive and lazy policing).
185. ‘‘The Ferguson protests’’ refers to a series of protests after the police shot and killed an
unarmed black teenager. The police contend that the shot was fired when the teenager grabbed
the officer’s gun. Others claim it was racial profiling. See Q & A: What Happened in Ferguson,
NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/fergusonmissouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html.
186. Brendan Cheney, Police Activity Dropped Before Major Slowdown, CAPITAL (Jan. 8,
2015),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2015/01/8559634/police-activitydropped-major-slowdown. Eric Garner suffocated while police officers were subduing him.
He was black and unarmed. This too sparked racial protests. See Al Baker, J. David Goodman,
& Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, NYTIMES.COM
(June
13,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-policechokehold-staten-island.html?_r=0.
187. See J. David Goodman & Al Baker, For Second Week, Arrests Plummet in New York City,
NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/nyregion/decrease-in-newyork-police-arrests-continues-for-a-second-week.html?_r=0.
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what other factors come into consideration? Is it the danger caused by drunk
driving? If individuals do not even trust law enforcement at a check point,
where every single car is pulled over, what kind of tension exists when an
officer pulls a single individual over based on a simple anonymous tip and
the officer cannot explain exactly why he is permitted to do so?
Admittedly, the Court has created other exceptions for officers
investigating driving under the influence.188 Because of the grave and
imminent danger of drunk driving, weighed against the minimal intrusion of
the check stop, the Supreme Court found that check stops were
constitutionally permissible.189 But the Court noted that further testing might
require an individualized suspicion standard.190 Even there, where the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the initial stop is valid, people are
unsure of exactly what that individualized standard is in regards to further
sobriety testing. In Florida, a movement is gaining traction that encourages
individuals to refuse to talk to police at a check stop.191 In fact, the movement
encourages individuals to hold a flyer up to the window stating that they are
stopping in compliance with the law, but that they are not required to roll
down the window and talk to the police.192
188. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (allowing officers to use
checkpoints to investigate drunk driving).
189. Id. at 455.
190. Id. at 451.
191. Melanie Moon, Loophole helping drivers skip DUI checkpoints, FOX2NOW (Feb. 20,
2015, 6:50 p.m.), http://fox2now.com/2015/02/20/loophole-helping-drivers-skip-duicheckpoints/ (hereinafter ‘‘Loophole’’). See also http://fairdui.org/.
192. Loophole, supra note 191. A lawyer has prepared several versions of the flyer to comply
with the laws of various states. The full text of the FAIRDUI flyer for Missouri states:
YOU HAVE DIRECTED ME INTO A DWI CHECKPOINT
I am not in an Intoxicated Condition as defined by Section 577.001.3, RSMo.
Pursuant to Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991) and State v. Dixon,
218 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) you have no basis for suspecting me of
a traffic offense or crime; therefore I do not have to supply my license and
insurance card to you.
However, based on my respect for law enforcement please see my license and
insurance card on the window below.
If you believe Missouri has a law requiring me to roll down my window, speak
to you, and hand you my license and insurance card, please understand that law
would be unconstitutional pursuant to the 4th Amendment under Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004).
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The attorney responsible for the movement stated that it’s ‘‘[b]ecause the
second you open your window they can say they smell alcohol.’’193 This
demonstrates a distinct lack of trust in law enforcement officers. But further,
it demonstrates distrust in how officers apply the standard of reasonable
suspicion. The statement clearly indicates a belief that an officer can and will
simply make up information and facts that amount to reasonable suspicion
in order to meet the individualized suspicion standard to do further sobriety
testing. If that is the case at a check stop where everyone is pulled over, then
imagine the belief when individuals are being pulled over solely on the basis
of an anonymous call.
To be fair, the Supreme Court only certified the question of whether an
anonymous tip had to be corroborated.194 And they answered that question:
Law enforcement officers are not required to personally observe the illegal
activity in order to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.195 The Court did
not certify the question of whether the danger and decreased expectation of
privacy resulted in a drunk driving exception under J.L. But in determining
the anonymous tip was reliable and the reasonable suspicion standard was
met, the Court did set a standard, albeit an unclear one, for law enforcement
to follow. Providing officers with factors to follow is extremely important.
But as Justice Scalia stated, the Navarette decision is inconsistent with
Alabama v. White and Florida v. J.L.196 At least in those cases, the Court was
clear about what the officers should be looking for: the anonymous tipster’s
basis of knowledge for making the claim.197 Specifically, the Court was
looking for this so they could determine the reliability of the tip, both in

With all due respect, I will not roll down my window or unlock my car unless
you present me with an arrest warrant or search warrant.
Please let me know when I am free to leave your DWI Checkpoint that you
directed me into against my will.
Thank you for your time, and have a nice evening.
Id.
193. Id.
194. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (No. 12-9490). See also
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 50 (2013) (granting certiorari limited to the first question
presented to the Court).
195. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014).
196. Id.
197. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
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regards to the innocent details and in regards to the allegation of
criminality.198
The grounds upon which Navarette was decided do not conform to the
common theme from previous anonymous tip cases. In one aspect, requiring
the tipster to claim eyewitness knowledge does comply with the basis of
knowledge requirement. However, that the officer need only verify the
location of the vehicle is inconsistent with the idea of reliability as to the
illegality of the accusation. In essence, Navarette contradicts the
determination that the anonymous tip must be reliable in more than the
innocent details. At least in the drunk driving context, so long as the officer
is able to locate the vehicle described-----a mere confirmation of the innocent
details-----then the officer is permitted to conduct the stop. Instead of looking
for a way to test the reliability, the officer is simply looking for the factors set
out in Navarette.
V. CONCLUSION
The state of reliability and reasonable suspicion in the drunk driving
context is a mess. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holding that the
proper test for reasonable suspicion is a totality of the circumstances test,
some courts have applied Navaratte like a bright line rule. Other courts use
it as an analytical framework, still managing to take other circumstances into
consideration. But the biggest problem is that the Court has been unclear as
to what roles, if any, the reduced expectation of privacy and the danger of the
underlying crime have on the determination of reliability of an anonymous
tip and its ability to provide reasonable suspicion.
While the Court was quite clear that officers need not corroborate an
anonymous tip of drunk driving, that standard may or may not apply in
investigating anonymous tips of other crimes. If lower courts apply the
factors as elements, then the officers will have an easier time determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists. But from a rights based perspective,
officers will have almost unlimited power to conduct stops based on
anonymous tips, so long as the caller uses 911 and claims to have witnessed
something. Additionally, if courts loosely interpret each factor, then an
officer’s power expands even further (such as interpreting a call to a hotline
or to the police dispatcher to be equivalent to a 911 call).199 But if the lower
courts apply the factors less mechanically, then the officer is still in the
unenviable position of trying to weigh whether reasonable suspicion exists in
198. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
199. Kinports, supra note 161, at 85.
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a split second, while courts will continue to evaluate their decisions after-thefact based on incomplete and vague decisions.
As it appears now, based on the holding in Navarette, the Court at the very
minimum has created a drunk driving exception in which the standard for
reliability, and therefore reasonable suspicion, is considerably lower than for
other crimes. If that is the case, the Court need simply acknowledge such an
exception and the role that the risk of harm and privacy play. If Navarette
established, instead, a bright line rule that applies regardless of the crime,
then that too must be acknowledged. Regardless of what is intended, the
Court must provide guidance, both to lower courts and to officers on the
streets. Otherwise, the precarious balance between protecting the public and
protecting individuals’ privacy will tip in one direction or the other.

